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SUMMARY RECORD OF TWELFTH MEETING OF
QUADRIPARTITE WORKING GROUP ON GERMANY AND BERLIN
APRIL 5, 1960

Participants:United Kingdom

Viscount Hood
 Mr. Drinkall
 Mr. Logan

Germany

Dr. Carstens
 Mr. Krapf
 Mr. Pauls
 Mr. Rueckriegel
 Mr. Osterheld

France

Mr. Winckler
 Mr. de Lousse

United States

Mr. Kohler
 Mr. Hillenbrand
 Mr. McSweeney
 Mr. Vigderman
 Mr. Kearney
 Mr. McKiernan
 Mr. Dean

Defense - Col. Schofield

Mr. Kohler tabled the redrafted version of the paper on Soviet intentions completed by the editorial subgroup in the morning and suggested that the Working Group begin its editorial work on this paper as a first section of the report to the Foreign Ministers. Mr. McSweeney reviewed the changes which had been made in the paper by the subgroup. With minor changes the paper was adopted.

The Group next considered the all-German section of the Working Group report tabled by the American side in the last meeting (II WGO/4.8). The discussion revolved mainly around the question of whether there should be changes in the sections of the Western Peace Plan having to do with disarmament as had been suggested by the British. Dr. Carstens pointed out that if all discussion on disarmament were left out of the Western Peace Plan, it might well appear to the German public that the link between disarmament and reunification which had been made in earlier Western positions on Germany and which already appeared to have undergone a number of changes had now been completely abandoned. For political reasons, therefore, the Federal Government was most anxious that the present disarmament sections be left in the Plan. The Federal Government would like to suggest that the Peace Plan be left in its original form and that the Western summit participants take account of possible

developments

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developments in the disarmament conference affecting Germany through making an oral statement in their presentation of the Peace Plan at the summit to the effect that its disarmament portions did not represent the final position of the Western powers on this subject and were subject to alteration in the light of actual developments. Mr. Kohler said that this seemed a useful suggestion, since to take out disarmament completely from the Western Peace Plan might leave a gaping and suspicious hole. As far as he knew there was nothing in the Western disarmament position contrary to the disarmament sections of the Peace Plan. Dr. Carstens said this was also his impression.

Lord Hood said that the case for the U.K. suggestion to omit discussion of disarmament in the Peace Plan was to give the Peace Plan a new look and make it shorter and more easily understood. The present introductory section of the Peace Plan made a link between German reunification and disarmament and could be reworded to be even stronger. It seemed that there was agreement in the Group not to change the present security and disarmament aspects of the Western Peace Plan, so that the Working Group had the choice either to include them as they were or to leave them out completely. Mr. Winckler said he felt the new look in the Western approach should come from an all-Berlin proposal and that it would be difficult to spark up the already complex Peace Plan. Mr. Kohler noted that the Western side had proposed an all-Berlin proposal in the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers. Mr. Winckler said that was correct but that this had been done too late in the conference for it to have a maximum public effect.

Dr. Carstens said it was the German feeling that the disarmament section was too important to be dropped from the Peace Plan. Rather than drop these portions, the German side would prefer not to resubmit the Peace Plan at all. It was possible that if the disarmament portions were removed from the Peace Plan that this would require the alteration or removal of the security phases of the Plan. Without treatment of the security question the Western Peace Plan would scarcely be considered a realistic inducement to the Soviets seriously to negotiate on the German question. Mr. Winckler said to omit an important part of the Peace Plan would raise many questions and that he considered Dr. Carstens' idea of an oral declaration to be a good one. The Western Peace Plan was a package proposal and it was doubtful whether the Working Group should attempt to open up this package and attempt to take it apart. Lord Hood said he was ready to be convinced by the German argumentation at this point. Mr. Kohler said it might be useful if an editorial subgroup examined the question. For example, if Dr. Carstens' proposal were to be followed, this portion of the Working Group report should contain specific language on the subject for consideration of the Foreign Ministers. It was agreed that a subgroup would work on this question.

With regard to the section of the all-German report dealing with

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Soviet peace treaty proposals. Mr. Kohler said he would like to suggest that the Western powers give consideration to adopting a standard terminology in calling these proposals the Soviet "partition proposals" or proposals for the partition of Germany since this was their intent. It would be quite wrong to accept the Soviet terminology on this question without rebuttal. In general, there was a necessity for more aggressive pre-summit publicity approach by the Western powers.

Dr. Carstens expressed doubt as to the desirability of a Western proposal to discuss a peace treaty in the all-German context. Such a Western proposal might detract from and weaken the force of the Western plebiscite proposal, which the German Federal Government heartily supported. Mr. Kohler noted that it was possible that the peace treaty issue could be used as a tactical device for extended discussion and negotiation by Foreign Ministers' deputies without making concessions to the Soviet idea that a peace treaty should be applied to separate parts of Germany. Dr. Carstens questioned whether it made sense to discuss the content of the peace treaty without first resolving the question of with whom it would be negotiated. Lord Hood said that the language of the American paper on this question was ambiguous. Apparently the possibility of discussion of a peace treaty had been considered as a purely tactical device and as such had some merits. If the occasion arose, it would be desirable to have our own draft principles of the peace treaty rather than negotiating on the basis of the Soviet principles. At any rate, this suggestion was intended for post-summit negotiation.

Dr. Carstens questioned the treatment of the all-German committee in the American paper unless the subject were more specifically defined. In general, the German side saw nothing to be gained from an all-German discussion and a great deal to be lost through giving status to the East German regime. Lord Hood asked in this regard what was the current standing of the earlier Bundestag resolution favoring some form of all-German commission under four-power supervision. Dr. Carstens said that that he would like to state in confidence that the Federal Government did not consider this resolution binding on its actions and, furthermore, that many Bundestag members who would have originally voted for the resolution had changed their minds in the intervening period when Soviet aims on Germany had become clearer. Mr. Kohler suggested that in view of the German objections, the sections of the draft paper on disarmament, peace treaty, and the all-German committee be left in abeyance until the Working Group had considered the tactics paper.

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